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1. INTRODUCTION
The discussion about voucher systems in general and the evaluation of
the Chilean voucher system in particular has centered, among other things, on
whether private schools are better than public schools, and on the importance of
sorting and the peer effect.
In this spirit, this paper presents some results regarding both issues.
Regarding the first issue I provide (based on published and ongoing work with
Bernardita Vial) evidence that private schools are better than public schools, when
they work with similar budgets.  On the second issue, I discuss the evidence
provided by papers such as McEwan and Carnoy (1998), and Hsieh and Urquiola
(2002) (hereafter HU), and provide some new evidence regarding these issues.  I
conclude that probably the key lesson from the Chilean experience is the importance
of the proper design of a voucher system.
The paper first discusses the characteristics of the Chilean voucher system,
then examines the literature that has evaluated it, and ends with two topics that
should be researched further: the regulation of the system by the Ministry of
Education, and the peer effect. I provide new results to evaluate the importance of
the latter.
2. IS CHILE A “TEXTBOOK” CASE?
Many of the papers in the literature describe the Chilean voucher system
as the “textbook” voucher case1.  But taking this route has prevented research
from understanding how the particular design of the Chilean voucher system
determines the results obtained in Chile.
In the “textbook” case schools with different internal incentive structures
(public and private) operate under the same external rules and with the same
budget (for which they compete).  But in Chile external rules differ.  Public schools
have to abide by the Teachers Labor Statute while private voucher schools (at
least formally), do not.  Public schools work under “soft budget constraints”, and
are therefore not necessarily influenced by competition from private schools. No
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page 1).
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public schools have closed, because all the schools that lost students to private
voucher schools received subsidies to pay the professors’ salaries, when needed.
Given this incentive structure, municipal schools facing competition from private
voucher schools may prefer students to leave, since they keep their jobs, and
teach smaller classes.
Some public schools are faced with the correct incentives. The existence of
additional subsidies, quite large in rich municipalities, presents schools in these
municipalities with the incentive to improve, receive more students, and receive
more subsidies.  Hence, incentives faced by municipal schools go both ways. A
pattern of results compatible with the existence of these two conflicting incentive
systems is shown in Sapelli and Vial (2002), where the average treatment effect
(ATE) is positive for private voucher schools with up to 25% less funds than
public schools, and negative when public schools have funds that are more than
25% above those used by private schools 2.
So the incentives faced by municipal schools are different from what they
are assumed to be in the “textbook” voucher system.  Municipal schools do not
face the choice of either supplying an adequate quality of education, or closing.
The choice they face may even be as perverse as whether to teach larger or smaller
classes.
Recognizing this perverse incentive, the Ministry of Education in Chile has
built a parallel system of incentives. In particular several supply subsidies (to the
school) are added in parallel to demand subsidies. This is a second deviation from
the “textbook” case. Several programs fund schools in certain circumstances (for
example, where poor students go). These funds operate as a tax to students that
would want to move to another school, as they do not follow them (see Sapelli and
Torche (2002) for an empirical estimate of how the design of the food program
makes it operate as a tax on mobility between schools).
Finally, the Ministry of Education in Chile is moving towards a “standards
based” evaluation of public schools.  In sum, it is a patchwork system of incentives.
3. IS THE “TEXTBOOK” CASE THE APPROPRIATE BENCHMARK?
Another issue of importance, related to whether sorting is inevitable or not,
is whether the textbook case is the appropriate benchmark. One key problem is
who gets paid how much.  If the cost of educating students to a certain level is a
negative function of the initial human capital of the child (or family income, or
parent education), then we should not have a flat subsidy (see Hoxby, 2001 or
2 These results are obtained using 1998 data for 2nd grade secondary school. Preliminary
work with 1999 4th year primary school data replicates the pattern: private subsidized
schools that work with up to 25% less budget than municipal schools have a TT effect
of 42, and an ATE not significantly different from zero.  Similar to the results for
primary, the TT becomes lower as transfers increase, turning negative for higher levels
of transfer.
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Aedo and Sapelli, 2001).  If students receive a flat subsidy then private voucher
schools will compete for those students with “rents” (those with higher initial
human capital), dissipating these rents with higher quality education.  They will
not compete for those with low initial human capital, where there are no rents,  or
negative rents.
Summing up, the Chilean voucher system has, on the demand and supply
side, at least two different sets of incentives: schools face different budgets and
incentives, and students face different choice sets.  Poor students have a lower
net subsidy and are more prone to be captive of the public education system.
Public schools do not face, in general, the incentives of competition, since they
face soft budget constraints. Moreover, the extra budget channeled to poor
students is given in the form of supply subsidies, a form that accentuates the
dependence of poor students on public schools.
These rules do give way to sorting, but other rules would imply competition
for all students. Sorting is not inevitable, but is a consequence of the design of the
subsidy3.  Different relative subsidies would be optimal.  That requires the design
of a system where relative prices are determined by supply and demand, not by a
government agency.  In sum, the “textbook” case is not the appropriate benchmark.
4. EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE
The most recent literature provides evidence that private voucher schools
are better than municipal schools (Gallego (2002); Sapelli and Vial (2002); Contreras
(2001); Mizala and Romaguera (2001); Tokman (2001)). Most of the papers written
in the last three years use individual data (not available before). Results changed
with respect to those obtained with school averages.
Others have stated that this difference in results between types of schools
is due to sorting and/ or the peer effect. Sorting is taken care of when the papers
control for family characteristics. The key remaining issue is whether the peer
effect is important. Regrettably, the literature contributes little to answer the question.
The key problem is the issue of causality.  HU show higher enrollment in
private schools coexists with lower test scores in public schools in the same
municipality. This could be either proof of the peer effect, or not, since entry is
endogenous and occurs first where municipal schools are doing a poor job (Hoxby
2001).  However, HU do not perform a test that explicitly controls for endogeneity.
Gallego (2002) finds that the issue is crucial: results with and without controlling
3 This problem is very similar to the one created by community rates in health insurance.
Community rates without risk rated subsidies (see van de Ven et al.(2000)) foster risk
selection (an activity with negative social value).  If risk rated subsidies are created,
then the problem of risk selection disappears and you can have community rates paid
by the insured and risk rated premiums received by the insurers. In some health economics
texts you also find the confusion and the belief that sorting is the key behavior by
which private insurance compete.  However, the rules are not analyzed to determine
whether this behavior is inevitable or is system dependent.
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for endogenous entry differ significantly. Gallego’s results, when controlling for
endogeneity, show that competition from private subsidized schools increase the
test scores of municipal schools 4.
5. WHICH SCHOOLS ARE BETTER?
Evaluating schools is complicated since different schools could be best for
different students.  This requires estimating treatment effects for different subsets
of the population. Sapelli and Vial (2002) estimate the treatment on the treated (TT)
effects and average treatment effects (ATE), controlling for individual characteristics
and school budget.  If they do not control for differences in budgets, Sapelli and
Vial find a substantially positive and significant TT effect, and a small and sometimes
insignificant ATE.
If peer effects are key, the effect of going to a private school on an average
student (i.e. the ATE), has to be positive and high since private schools have
better peer groups. If the ATE is low, as found  by Sapelli and Vial, the peer effect
cannot be as important as claimed.
Sapelli and Vial then take into consideration heterogeneous budgets, and
distribute municipal schools according to transfers received in addition to the
subsidy.  They find a larger positive TT when private schools are compared to low
transfer municipal schools,  but a negative TT when compared to municipal schools
with substantially larger budgets.  For schools that work with similar budgets,
results are much better in private voucher schools. Similar results are found for the
ATE.
6. REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS
A detailed study of the regulation of private voucher schools, and how
they may thwart the operation of a voucher system, is pending.  An over-regulated
private system will offer what  regulators demand.  According to Gauri (1998) “All
told, the government monitors private schools more closely and frequently than at
any other time in Chilean history, a surprisingly paradoxical outcome…”.  “The
inspections and central government rules raise the costs of innovation for both
municipal and private schools.”
It may be a puzzle how, in this context, private voucher schools manage to
obtain better test results. One hypothesis is that they specialize in an area where
municipal schools are doing a bad job and where the government is less restrictive:
discipline.  They produced better academic results as a byproduct (i.e. there are
economies of scope in the production of discipline and academic achievement).
4 Note that Gallego obtains the HU results when not controlling for endogenous entry.
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7. THE PEER EFFECT
Sometimes what is implied by “the peer effect” is that good students have
a positive externality on bad students.  Alternatively, it is assumed that the effect
is symmetric, and dispersion is irrelevant. That, for example, is what Epple and
Romano (1998) assume: achievement is a positive function of mean ability in the
class.  This implies that adding two persons with ability one or two standard
deviations from the mean in opposite directions, is the same.  But a class with
brilliant and dumb students is different from one where all students are similar.
If mean peer ability may be productive, a low standard deviation (SD) of
peer ability could also be productive.  The issue is important, since we cannot
change the mean by sorting (sorting is a zero sum game here), but we can lower the
average of all schools SD by sorting (i.e. average class SD can be much lower than
population SD).  I find that a larger SD of ability in schools, implies lower test
scores, ceteris paribus. The evidence is compatible with the existence of different
production functions. Rural and municipal schools have a comparative advantage
in classes with disperse peer ability; and urban and private schools have one in
classes with relatively less disperse peer ability.  Moreover, urban private schools
have an absolute advantage over most of the relevant SD of ability range (see
Figures 1 and 2, explained bellow).
FIGURE 1
SIMCE  SCORES  AS  A  FUNCTION  OF  SCHOOL  SD  OF  ABILITY ,
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FIGURE 2
HISTOGRAM
The existence of different production functions can be due to the fact
that ones ability is an input into the production function, and that public and
private schools handle this input differently.  In a public system the input
is controlled by the state and used as if it where free, in a private system that
input is controlled by private individuals and has a price. In the public system
the input may be used inefficiently.  For example, public schools teachers may
appropriate the externality, using this free input in substitution for their own effort.
The evidence shows that all schools are benefited by a reduction in the SD
of school ability, except for rural municipal schools.  The reduction produces an
increase in mean achievement that is more than twice as large for urban private
than for urban municipal schools.
8. PEER EFFECT: RESULTS
I use data from the 1999 SIMCE results (4th year primary school), joint with
a survey on parents. From the latter I obtain the education of the mother, that I use
as a proxy for student ability.
I start by describing the distribution of scores and ability within schools
(see Table 1).
The coefficient of variation (CV) of mother’s education, with respect to
urban private voucher schools, is 29% higher in rural private voucher schools,
36% higher in urban municipal schools, and 51% higher in rural municipal schools.
The CV of math scores, with respect to urban private voucher schools is,
15% higher for rural private voucher schools, 17% higher for urban municipal
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Average of the coefficient of variation
Language Maths
Mother´s
education Type of school
0,164 0,166 0,286 All Private Subsidized
0,173 0,176 0,309 All Urban
0,173 0,176 0,337 All
0,178 0,181 0,366 All Municipal
0,178 0,178 0,391 All Rural
0,146 0,157 0,256 Urban Private Subs.
0,192 0,180 0,330 Rural Private Subs.
0,182 0,184 0,347 Urban Municipal
0,175 0,178 0,386 Rural Municipal
a lower dispersion of abilities and results.  Both rural and urban private voucher
schools have a lower dispersion than average, while urban municipal  schools
have a higher dispersion.
TABLE 1
THE SD OF SCORES AND ABILITY BY SCHOOL TYPE
The coefficient of variation (CV) of mother’s education, with respect to
urban private voucher schools, is 29% higher in rural private voucher schools,
36% higher in urban municipal schools, and 51% higher in rural municipal schools.
The CV of math scores, with respect to urban private voucher schools is,
15% higher for rural private voucher schools, 17% higher for urban municipal
school, and 13% higher for rural municipal schools. Private voucher schools have
a lower dispersion of abilities and results.  Both rural and urban private voucher
schools have a lower dispersion than average, while urban municipal  schools
have a higher dispersion.
We regress average math score on the SD of mothers education by school,
in interaction with area (urban/rural) and type of school (private/municipal).  We
also include a dummy for area and type of school and the log of the mean of the
mothers education at the school. The results are (see Table 2):
Test results are always better when the SD of ability is lower (except for
rural municipal schools).   Urban private voucher schools are better than all others
in schools with a dispersion of peer ability in the range from 0 SDs to 3,83 SDs (see
Figure 1).  Private voucher urban schools are better than municipal urban schools
(see the histogram of SDs) for most of the SD range, since 3,83 is well out in the
right hand tail of the distribution (see Figure 2).  In Figure 1, one can observe that
private voucher urban schools are 40 points better for a SD of zero, 20 points better
for a SD of two, 10 points better for a SD of three, and about one point worse for a
SD of four.
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TABLE  2
9. CONCLUSIONS
In sum, the literature on the importance of sorting and the peer effect may
have the issues backwards: sorting is important only because of the inappropriate
design of the system, and the peer effect is actually not as important and depends
on technological choice.  In sum, sorting is productive and schools are better if
they teach more similar students.
The key lesson from the Chilean experience is that results depend on the




















Area (1 rural) -41.92
3,40
-12,32
Type school (1 private subs) 39,46
3,54
11,11
Ln mean mother education 11,47
1,63
7,00
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